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Introduction
During the recovery after the global financial and economic crisis, the controversial dispute about global imbalances has been revived (Feldstein 2008 , Bernanke et al. 2011 ). The origins of the current account imbalances between East Asia and the US have been attributed to an East Asian saving glut (Bernanke 2005 , Bernanke et al. 2011 ) combined with mercantilist trade strategies (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2003 and Bergsten 2010) . In contrast, Chinn and Ito (2008) point to a US saving deficiency and expansionary US fiscal policies. McKinnon and Schnabl (2009) attribute the trade imbalance between the US and East Asia to expansionary US macroeconomic policies causing unintended periphery reserve accumulation. In this context in particular the role of international capital flows for global imbalances has received close attention (Lahiri and Morshed 2009, Gruber and Kamin 2009) .
In Europe, the 2010/11 euro crisis triggered an extensive discussion about intra-European current account imbalances which have emerged between Germany and several European countries inside and outside the euro area. Whereas Sinn (2010) argues that the European deficit countries have to restrict private and public spending to cure the intra-European imbalances, the French minister Lagard sees the origins of the crisis in "excessive" German savings and export competitiveness. Berger and Nitsch (2010) argue that the current account imbalances within the euro area have been caused by the elimination of foreign exchange risk after the euro introduction.
Despite the intensive discussion about imbalances in the dollar and the euro blocs very few papers have aimed to trace the reasons for diametrically opposed current account trends in both regions (Herrmann and Winkler 2008) . In the dollar bloc, the US as -what we call -center country has continued to run current account deficits whereas an increasing number of -what we call -periphery countries have run current account surpluses. In contrast in Europe, Germany -defined as a center country -has produced rising current account surpluses, which are matched by current account deficits of many other European countries. Whereas the current account posi-tions of the European periphery countries are in line with Lucas' (1990) assumption that capital should flow from rich to poor countries where the marginal return to investment is higher, in the dollar periphery the capital is flowing uphill from the periphery to the center. The resulting asymmetry in world current accounts is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Previous papers have focused on the role of fiscal policies for the global current account imbalances (Chinn and Ito 2008) . We complement this analysis by following Aizenmann and Lee (2008) to scrutinize the role of reserve accumulation extended by the role of monetary policies in anchor and periphery countries to trace the origins of global imbalances. This approach shall us also provide an answer to the question of why the current accounts of Germany and its "periphery" have behaved antipodal to the US and the dollar periphery countries.
Transmission of Current Account Imbalances within an Asymmetric World

Monetary System
We base our analysis on the fact that the world monetary system is asymmetric, with very few countries and currencies being in the center of the world monetary system and a large number of countries using these currencies for their international (and domestic) transactions. The present prominent role of the dollar as international money can be rooted in the post-war political and economic hegemony of the US under the Bretton Woods System (McKinnon 2010) . It persists due to network externalities and economies of scale, which determine the currency habitat of emerging markets and developing countries with underdeveloped and fragile capital and goods markets.
Backed by the large size of US goods and financial markets -outside of Europe -the dollar is the dominant international means of payment, unit of account and store of value. Due to the substantial size of the European goods and financial markets, the euro has steadily gained importance within the EU and in countries linked to the European integration process (ECB 2010 ). An increasing number of countries bor-dering the euro area have redirected their exchange rate strategies towards the euro and are increasingly holding euro denominated assets. Beyond the European Union the euro has gained a prominent role in the issuances of international debt securities, cross border loans and foreign exchange trading Frankel 2008 and ECB 2010) .
Given the asymmetric use of national monies for international exchange a stylized pattern of the world monetary system has emerged. The US dollar is the dominant world currency with a large number of countries pegging their currencies more or less tightly to the dollar. The most important regions, which maintain common dollar pegs (as part of the informal dollar standard) are East Asia, the Middle East, (Latin) America and the Commonwealth of Independent States including Russia. 1 The euro is the second (regional) international currency with a flexible rate against the dollar. In the backyard of the euro area an increasing number of countries are pegging their currencies to the euro. This implies flexible exchange rates between the euro periphery and the dollar periphery. But why do the current accounts of the euro area periphery countries (as well as countries within the euro area) behave different to the current accounts of the dollar periphery countries? Europe and the informal dollar standard will be -in line with McKinnon and Schnabl (2009) and Hung and Gamber (2010) -discussed in turn based on the absorption approach to current accounts.
Current Account Transmission in Europe
The rise of current account imbalances in Europe started with the turn of the millennium ( Figure 1 ). This roughly follows or coincides with the official introduction of the euro in January 1999 (Berger and Nitsch 2010) The composition of the single country groups is listed in Table 1 . The African countries partly peg to the euro and partly to the dollar. They are not included in the sample for parsimony reasons. Although Russia has adopted a currency basket containing both euro and dollar we list it as a member of the dollar periphery. negative in the early 1990s due to a sudden rise of investment and consumption during the unification process turned positive far beyond the pre-unification level after the turn of the millennium.
To answer the question of why the German current account turned positive after 2000 we assume German attempts to regain international competitiveness after the unification boom as exogenous (Schnabl and Zemanek 2010) . The unification had led to a hike in the public debt level (inter alia due to high costs of rebuilding the East German infrastructure etc.) and to a surge in unit labor costs (inter alia due to hiking social security expenditure because of sharply rising unemployment). Both factors were reflected in a negative current account balance. After the unification boom had ended in the mid 1990s, the German government made considerable attempts to consolidate public expenditure to comply with the stability and growth pact. The German industry sought to reduce unit labor costs to regain international competitiveness.
Cutting wage costs in both the private and public sector was possible, because the hike in unemployment as well as wage pressure from Central and Eastern Europe had eroded the bargaining power of German trade unions.
The resulting gloomy business sentiment in Germany stimulated precautionary savings of the private sector and put a drag on German fixed capital formation. In the second half of 1990s the rising surplus of saving above fixed capital investment was absorbed domestically by the new economy boom. After the burst of the new economy bubble in the year 2000 capital exports looked more attractive. The incentive to invest in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the western European islands and the US was even larger, because decisive interest rate cuts by the US Fed and the ECB boosted economic activity and asset prices in these regions. In the US, UK and Ireland US Fed and ECB interest rate cuts had contributed to booming financial sector activity and rising prices in the (subprime) real estate markets (Hoffmann and Schnabl 2008) . In Spain and Central and Eastern Europe surging real estate and stock prices created an incentive to invest German savings. In other euro area countries, the introduction of the euro seemed to have eliminated foreign exchange and default risk for investment in government bonds.
Figure 2 models the resulting current account transmission from Germany to the
Central and Eastern European countries as well as for some euro area periphery countries. We assume German net saving behavior as exogenous because of a country specific adjustment process after the unification boom. The austerity in Germany following the unification boom led to an outward shift of the saving curve (from S1 to S2) (alternatively or simultaneously an inward shift of the investment curve) after the turn of the millennium. The resulting increase in the saving-investment gap was underpinned by the ECB interest rate cut following the burst of the new economy bubble (from i1 and i2). CM C . Note that in Figure 3 we assume because of the consequences of unification shock and the large size of Germany, a unidirectional causality running from Germany to the smaller European "periphery" countries. The ECB interest rate policies are assumed to be transmitted independent from the exchange rate regime either via tightly fixed exchange rates (as for instance in the Baltic countries), discretionary exchange rate stabilization (as for 2
The asterisk labels the periphery.
instance in the Romania), interest rate cuts to shield off speculative capital inflows or outright membership in the euro area. 3
Current Account Transmission in the Dollar Bloc
On a global level the imbalances between the US and the countries pegging their currencies to the US dollar dramatically increased following the 1997/98 Asian crisis as shown in Figure 1 . Because the loose US monetary policy also contributed to hiking oil and raw material prices, oil and raw material exporting countries felt forced to tighten monetary policy stances. For sterilization purposes they mainly used government deposits at the central bank and fast growing stabilization funds (Schnabl and Schobert 2009 ). As shown in Figure 1 , the current account imbalances between the US and the countries pegging their currencies to the dollar further hiked after the year 2001, now being dubbed "global imbalances".
Figure 3 models the emergence of global imbalances based on the assumption that monetary policy of the US as the largest economy with a prominent role of its currency within an asymmetric world monetary system is exogenous. We allow for feedback effects of exchange rate stabilization and sterilization in the periphery countries on US interest rates. In contrast to the European setting it is assumed that capital is exported from the dollar periphery (CX1*) to the center (CM1), where a negative saving-investment gap (S1<I1) is closed by capital imports. The (accumulated) current account of the dollar periphery (CA1*) is positive, whereas the current account of the US (-CA1) is negative. As in the case of Europe, the international capital market within the dollar bloc is assumed to be in equilibrium at i1=i1*.
The US central bank is assumed to cut interest rates exogenously. There are (inter alia) two possible reasons. First, a sudden price decline in stock or real estate markets seems to make interest rate cuts necessary to preserve financial stability and growth.
Second, with the government pursuing an expansionary fiscal policy, the central bank cuts interest rates to neutralize Mundell-Fleming type crowding out effects (Freitag and Schnabl 2010 In Figure 4 the non-market based sterilization policies are modeled by diverging interest rates between domestic and international capital markets. The official nonmarket based sterilization rate i2a* models the remuneration rate of sterilization instruments, which remains low at the international level to discourage additional capital inflows. The interest rate, which reflects the tightened liquidity conditions in the domestic market, is i2b*. The divergence of the non-market based sterilization rate i2a* and the interest rate i2b* reflecting tightened liquidity conditions models domestic capital market fragmentation and is usually underpinned by international capital controls.
International capital markets are fragmented as the de facto domestic interest rate level i2b* in the periphery country is delinked from the interest rate level in the center country i2 (= i2a*). On the international capital and goods markets an equilibrium be- 
Estimation Frameworks and Data
Our model for current account transmission is empirically tested in two ways. First, as periphery reserve accumulation and interest rates in the centers are acknowledged to play an important role for global current account balances we aim to disentangle the direction of causality between both variables. Second, we aim to identify the macroeconomic determinants of the world current account imbalances with a focus on monetary policies in center and periphery countries.
Estimation Frameworks
First, we perform a panel Granger causality test for monetary policies in the centers and reserve accumulation in the peripheries. The Granger test aims to provide evidence in favor of either Bernanke et al. (2011) or McKinnon and Schnabl (2009) . Alternatively, bi-directional causality between center interest rates and periphery reserve accumulation may be revealed. Granger causality tests (Granger 1969) are a standard tool to analyze causality linkages in applied econometrics. More recently Granger causality tests have been applied to a panel context (Holtz-Eakin et al. 1988, Hurlin and Venet 2004 ). Arellano-Bond estimators are applied to cope with the inherent endogeneity problem (Arellano and Bond 1991) . Because the standard errors of twostep estimators tend to be biased downwards, Blundell and Bond (1998) Second, we aim to jointly trace the impact of center and periphery macroeconomic policies on the current account positions. Our estimations focus on the role of monetary and exchange rate policies for the global imbalances as stressed above. As sug-gested by Chinn and Ito (2008) we control for the impact of fiscal policies on net government savings. On the side of the periphery countries, the main policy variable is assumed to be the exchange rate as assumed by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) . We use foreign reserve accumulation as a proxy for exchange rate stabilization. In addition -given nominal exchange rate stabilization -current account balances can be affected by sterilization operations for two reasons (Freitag and Schnabl 2010) : First, non-market based sterilization depresses investment without stimulating saving. Second, as in the case of many raw material exporting countries, sterilization via government deposits at the central bank has a positive impact on government saving and a negative impact on private investment. For the second panel estimation we use a GMM estimator for the cross country panel (Arellano and Bond 1991, Blundell and Bond 1998) .
Data
The sample contains the US and Germany as center countries and 91 periphery countries. The periphery sub-samples correspond to the six peripheries as identified in All data are from the IMF (WEO, IFS) or national central bank statistics. Yearly current account data, government deficits and foreign reserves are measured in percent of GDP. Yearly interest rates are included in levels. The proxy for sterilization is calculated as the gap between net foreign assets and currency in circulation as percent of GDP. 4 Panel unit root tests reveal that there is no concern about stationary in the data set. In monthly data the interest rates are also measured in levels. While foreign reserves measured as a percentage of GDP are stationary for yearly data, the same proxy is not stationary for monthly data. Therefore, monthly foreign reserves are proxied as the absolute first differences divided by GDP. 5
Estimation Results
To test for current account transmission in the euro area and in the dollar area we perform Granger and panel GMM estimations for the world as a whole and single country groups. As China is of particular policy interest with respect to global imbalances, we report isolated results for China, albeit the sample size is very small and therefore the results have to be treated with caution.
Granger Tests
As stressed above the direction of causality between center interest rates and periphery reserve accumulation can go into one or the other direction. This may indicate a bi-directional, self-reinforcing relationship, which is tested based on a panel Granger causality framework.
The results for the Granger causality tests are reported in Table 2 . For the estimations monthly data are used, which helps to increase the robustness of the results. Fur-4 Concerning more information on the choice of this sterilization proxy see Schnabl and Schobert (2009). 5 Relative and absolute first differences are both used in the literature. We apply absolute first differences of foreign reserves as a percentage of GDP. Percent changes of foreign reserves decline when stocks of foreign reserves rise as it is the case in most countries since the turn of the millennium. thermore, we assume in line with the tests above that monetary policy decisions are represented by interest rates in the center countries and by reserve accumulation in the peripheries. In the upper part of 
Policy Transmission
Monetary policies in both centers and peripheries were identified in section 2 as crucial determinants of current account positions. Building upon the discussion above we test for the transmission of center and periphery macroeconomic policies on the overall current account positions. On the side of the center countries we use monetary and fiscal policies as determinants of the current accounts. On the side of the periphery countries reserve accumulation and sterilization policies are used as determinants of the current account. The results are reported in Table 3 .
The upper part of Table 3 models For the other country groups with respect to the US, the evidence for the impact of center and periphery macroeconomic policies on current accounts is mixed. For (Latin) America, the current account positions seem to be driven by US monetary policies and periphery reserve accumulation. Periphery sterilization policies have the wrong sign. In the Middle East only sterilization policies, represented by general government surpluses and government deposits at the central bank, turn out highly significant. This is in line with the twin surpluses of the oil exporting countries and the low price elasticity of raw material exports. As sterilization slows down domestic consumption, investment and imports while public saving hikes, current account surpluses increase.
In the CIS, only US interest rates are significant at the common significance levels.
For Emerging Europe, neither US macroeconomic policies nor sterilization patterns seem to have an impact on the current account positions. In contrast to East Asia and Latin America, reserve accumulation is linked to rising current account deficits.
Finally, for the world as a whole both US monetary policies as well as periphery sterilization and exchange rate stabilization policies seem to have an impact on current accounts at the common significance levels.
In the lower part of Table 3 the estimation results with Germany as a center country are reported. In general there is strong indication for a negative correlation between
German interest rates and the current account balances of the dollar peripheries, industrialized Europe and Germany itself (declining interest rates in Germany and the euro area are accompanied by improving current account positions). With respect to Germany, Emerging Europe is of specific interest. In sharp contrast to the dollar periphery, declining interest rates in the Germany and the euro area are linked -in line with Figure 3 -to rising current account deficits in Emerging Europe (and US) at high significance levels. A declining government deficit in Germany (for instance in economic upswings) is accompanied by declining current account deficits in Emerging Europe. In contrast to East Asia sterilization policies in Emerging Europe have a no significant impact on the Emerging European current account balances, because the European treaties strongly restrain non-market based sterilization operations.
Thus, the main reason for the divergence between East Asian and Emerging European current account balances are not different monetary policies of the centers or differing nominal exchange rate strategies but different attitudes with respect to sterilization and thereby real exchange rate stabilization.
Conclusion
In the recovery after the global crisis -as represented by the revived conflict about the Chinese dollar peg -global imbalances can be expected to strengthen again. Our paper aimed to trace the origins and transmission channels of asymmetric global imbalances based on the assumption that the world can be subdivided into two center and many periphery countries. We have shown that there is no mono-causal, unidirectional explanation to global imbalances. Instead, global imbalances are seen as the outcome of monetary and exchange rate policy interaction of center and periphery countries under different institutional frameworks.
In the US, low interest rates are argued to have contributed to the current account deficit as saving declined and investment rose. In the dollar periphery, in particular in East Asia the combination of nominal and real exchange rate stabilization can be seen as the reason for current account surpluses. In this context, the periphery countries may have few degrees of freedom concerning both exchange rate stabilization and sterilization, because goods and capital markets are underdeveloped and shallow.
Without nominal exchange rate stabilization and sterilization these countries -in particular China -would be victims to (even stronger) inflation and overheating as it was the case in Emerging Europe prior to the recent crisis and as in East Asia prior to the Asian crisis.
To this end, as partially reflected in the econometric exercises, the imbalances within the dollar bloc are the outcome of a mutual self-reinforcing process. This does not solve the question of if the center or the periphery have triggered the vicious cycle of interest rate cuts and reserve accumulation. One could argue, however, that only the center countries have the necessary structural characteristics to give momentum to such a process. Nevertheless, we have shown that the current account imbalances have become a two-sided issue, which can only be cured by combined efforts. While the United States has to return to tighter monetary policies, the dollar periphery countries including China have to curtail sterilization operations and strengthen domestic demand.
With respect to Germany and the smaller European countries the econometric exercise did not yield sufficient evidence to answer the question of why many European countries have continued to run current account deficits while Germany has moved into current account surpluses. Yet the theoretical analysis implies that the exogenous shock of the German unification is likely to play an important role up to the present in combination with the inability of European periphery countries to sterilize capital inflows. If this is the case the intra-European imbalances have to be addressed by fiscal and mainly wage policies rather than nominal exchange rate adjustment.
Figure 1: Asymmetric Global Current Accounts
Source: IFS 2010. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Estimates for constant terms are not reported. The Arellano-Bond one-step estimator was applied. East Asia-10 encompasses China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. The US is used as a center country for the dollar peripheries; Germany is used as a center country for Emerging Europe and Industrialized Europe excluding Germany. 1754  214  526  346  143  276  442  28  28  28  Countries  76  8  19  13  10  19  16  1  1 1 Two-step Arellano-Bond estimators with country fixed effects are applied. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. J-Statistics for all estimates < 0.001, χ2(1), p-value > 0.99. Aggregates of the CIS and Emerging Europe are based on data from 1994 to 2008. +: Dollar Periphery, ++: Emerging Europe and industrialized Europe excluding Germany.
